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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
·CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Comm.erce Clause-1966
Amendments to Fair Labor Standards Act
Extending Coverage to Employees in
State-Operated Schools, Hospitals, and
Related Institutions Held Constitutional
-Maryland v. Wirtz*
In 1966, Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act1
(FLSA) and for the first time extended the coverage of the minimum
wage and overtime provisions to employees in state-operated schools,
hospitals, and related institutions.2 The State of Maryland, joined by
twenty-seven other states,3 brought an action to enjoin enforcement
of the amendments insofar as they applied to these state-operated
facilities and sought a declaratory judgment ruling the amendments
unconstitutional. The states asserted that the amendments were unconstitutional in two respects. First, they contended that the "enterprise" concept of FLSA coverage, which extended the Act to cover
all employees of an "enterprise" if some of those employees were
"engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,"4
was an invalid exercise of congressional power under the commerce
clause.5 Second, the states made the two-pronged assertion that their
" 269 F. Supp. 826 (D. Md. 1967), appeal docketed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Oct. 19,
1967), jurisdiction on appeal to the United States Supreme Court noted, CCH LAB.
L. REP. (1 WAGES AND HoURS) at 35,492 Gan. 15, 1968) (hereinafter cited as the
principal case]. For a detailed analysis of the judges' opinions in the principal case,
see Recent Decision, A Balancing Test for the Commerce Power?, 56 G1::o. L.J. 392
(1968); Comment, Constitutional Law-Fair Labor Standards Act-1966 Amendments
Extending Coverage to Certain Employees of State Public Schools, Hospitals, and
Related Institutions Held Constitutional, 43 Nonu: DAME LAw. 414 (1968).
1. 29 u.s.c. §§ 201-19 (1964).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203-18 (Supp. II, 1967), amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1964). Section
203(r) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) as amended extends coverage to employees of enterprises operating suburban or interurban electric railways and local
trolley or motorbus carriers, whether public or private, as well as to employees of
schools, hospitals, and related institutions. However, the states limited their challenge
to the inclusion of the employees of public schools, hospitals, and related institutions.
Undoubtedly, the states followed this course in order to avoid strong past precedent
upholding federal regulation of state-operated railways. See notes 52-55 infra and
accompanying text.
3. Along with Maryland, the following states and their political subdivisions intervened as parties plaintiff under FED. R. Crv. P. 24: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and
Wyoming. In addition, the Fort Worth, Texas Independent School District joined in
the action. Amicus curiae briefs in support of the Secretary of Labor were filed by
the AFL-CIO and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,
AFL-CIO.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(r) &: (s) (Supp. II, 1967) (quoted at notes 14-15 infra).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power ••• To Regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes ••••"
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activities in operating schools and hospitals are entirely outside the
scope of the congressional power to regulate commerce, 6 and, alternatively, that, even if their activities could be considered within the
scope of that power, the application of federal wage and hour regulation interferes with the states' performance of their sovereign functions and thus violates the basic federal scheme of the Constitution
as declared by the tenth amendment. 7 A three-judge federal district
court8 denied the injunction, holding that Congress did not exceed
its power by applying the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA to
employees in state-operated schools and hospitals, and that the "enterprise" concept of coverage is not itself an unconstitutional extension of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce.9
Prior to 1961, the FLSA did not extend to "enterprises" but covered only individual employees in private businesses who were personally "engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce."10 Each individual employee had to fall within
this standard to be covered; 11 thus, it was theoretically possible for
6. Brief for Plaintiff State of Maryland at 13-22.

7. Brief for Plaintiff State of Maryland at 28-48. The states admitted that the
tenth amendment operates merely as a declaration of the relationship between the
federal and state governments [United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)] and thus
does not bar a congressional exercise of a granted power over state activities incidentally falling within the scope of such regulation [see, e.g., Parden v. Terminal R.R.
of Alabama Docks Dep't., 377 U.S. 184 (1964)]. Nevertheless, they argued that if the
tenth amendment is to have any meaning at all, it must limit congressional power
to the extent of preventing Congress from enacting measures destructive of our federal
system of government under the guise of regulating interstate commerce. Brief for
the Plaintiff State of Maryland at 48-49a.
8. The three-judge court was convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1964), which provides that an application for a permanent or interlocutory injunction restraining the
enforcement, operation, or execution of a congressional act must be heard and determined by a district court composed of three judges.
9. After the decision by the district court, the states secured an extension of the
temporary restraining order issued at the commencement of the suit so as to enjoin
enforcement of the FLSA until the states could prosecute a direct appeal to the United
States Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964). The case has been docketed
and is now pending before the Supreme Court. 36 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1967),
jurisdiction on appeal to the Supreme Court noted, CCH LAB. L. REP. (1 WAGES AND
HOURS) a 35,492 (Jan. 15, 1968).
10. Employees of states and their political subdivisions were expressly excluded
prior to 1961. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1964). Congress gave no express reason for providing
this exclusion for state employees. Apparently it did so in order to avoid any possible
constitutional problems. Thus, during hearings on the proposed statute, Attorney
General Jackson testified that "there is a constitutional problem involved the moment
the Federal Government attempts to regulate anything that a State ••• does in reference to its employees." Hearings on S. 2475 and H.R. 7200 Before the Senate Comm.
on Labor and the House Comm. on Labor, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 82 (1937).
11. Because the statutory language was framed in terms of an employee's "engaging
in commerce," the Supreme Court held in a series of pre-1961 cases that the fact that
an employee "affected commerce" was not sufficient to bring him within the statutory
coverage of the FLSA. For an excellent review of these decisions, see Goldberg v. Wade
Lahar Constr. Co., 290 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 427 (1961).
Although something more than merely "affecting" commerce was required, direct
contact with interstate commerce was not essential to coverage of an employee; it was
considered sufficient if the activity engaged in by the employee was "in proximity to
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the Act to cover only a fraction of the employees of a given business.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the Act's standard of coverage in United States v. Darby Lumber Co.12 on the grounds that
"an employee's engagement in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce" is one of "those activities intra-state which so
affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress
over it, as to make the regulation of them appropriate means to the
attainment of a legitimate end ...." 13
commerce" [Mitchell v. H. B. Zachery Co., 362 U.S. 310 (1960)] or so closely related
to commerce as to be capable of being considered a part thereof. Mitchell v. Vollmer
& Co., 349 U.S. 427 (1955). Because the application of the FLSA was thus completely
dependent upon the nature of the employee's activities and not upon the character
of the employer's business, the fact that an employer was engaged in commerce or
was even affecting commerce did not mean that all his employees were necessarily
covered by the FLSA. Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946);
Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942).
12. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
13. 312 U.S. at 118. In upholding the original FI.SA as a valid exercise of the
commerce power, the Court specifically overruled its prior decision in Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). It held that the power to regulate interstate commerce and those intrastate activities having a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce includes the power to prohibit the interstate shipment of goods produced in
violation of the FLSA. Prior to Hammer, charges that wage and hour regulation exceeded the limits of the commerce power, violated the fifth amendment, and invaded
the reserved powers of the states were sufficient to invalidate federal wage-hour legislation. Although it was recognized that the federal government, the states, and municipalities could constitutionally regulate wage rates for persons employed on public
work so long as the requirements of certainty and reasonableness had been met [see
cases cited in Annots., 50 A.L.R. 1480 (1927); 132 A.L.R. 1297 (1941)], the Supreme
Court persisted in frustrating legislative policy. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital,
261 U.S. 525 (1923) (holding a congressional statute which gave a minimum wage
board the power to fix minimum wages for women in the District of Columbia
violative of the due process clause of the fifth amendment); Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 379 (1918) (holding the Federal Child Labor Law of 1916 unconstitutional
on the grounds that the commerce clause did not empower Congress to exclude products from interstate commerce unless the articles in question were inherently dangerous). See also Annot., 90 A.L.R. 814 (1934), for a detailed analysis of earlier cases
recognizing the validity of statutes limiting only the hours of labor in private industry.
The following pre-Darby articles are of interest in regard to the historical development of the wage and hour law: Symposium-The Wage and Hour Law, 6 I.Aw &
CoNTEMP. PROB. 321 (1939); Note, The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 39 CoLUM.
L. REv. 818 (1939); Comment, The Federal Wages and Hours Act, 52 HARV. L. REv.
646 (1939); Note, Constitutional Aspects of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 87
U. PA. L. REv. 91 (1938).
Subsequently, the Adkins case was overruled by the Supreme Court in West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), where the Court upheld a Washington statute
setting minimum wages for women. The West Coast Hotel case, together with the
overruling of Hammer v. Dagenhart in Darby, evinced a marked change in judicial
attitude, which in turn opened the door for the far-reaching wage and hour statutes
thereafter enacted by both Congress and the states. This subsequent development is
analyzed in Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 740 (1955). Thus, the Supreme Court has rejected
contentions that the FLSA constitutes an improper delegation of legislative powers
[Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941)], an infringement of
freedom of the press [Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946)],
an authorization of unreasonable searches and seizures [Oklahoma Press Publishing
Co. v. Walling, supra] and a law which provides arbitrary and discriminatory bases
for exemption [Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946)].
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The 1961 amendments significantly expanded the original coverage of the Act by introducing the "enterprise" concept.14 Congress
defined a regulated enterprise not as a business unit that "affects
commerce," but instead as one "which has employees engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce . . . .''15 This
language has been administratively interpreted to mean that an enterprise which has more than one employee engaged in commerce
can be brought within the coverage of the Act. 16 Once an enterprise
is brought within the ambit of the Act, all of its employees are covered by the regulatory provisions. The states in the principal case
claimed that this was an unconstitutional extension of the commerce
power because it may extend coverage to employees who have no
connection with interstate commerce other than the fact that two
of their fellow employees are engaged in commerce.17
Although two other courts had previously been presented with
this problem, 18 the court in the principal case was the first court to
make a conclusive determination of the constitutionality of the enterprise concept and to present cogent reasons for its holding. In
validating the new coverage, the court relied mainly on the similarity
between the regulation of an enterprise in the context of the FLSA
and the regulation of an employer under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 19 Under section 10 of the NLRA, 20 the National
14. "Enterprise" is defined in § 203(r) as follows:
"Enterprise" means the related activities performed (either through unified operation or common control) by any person or persons for a common business purpose, and includes all such activities whether performed in one or more estab•
lishments or by one or more corporate or other organizational units including
departments of an establishment operated through leasing arrangements, but
shall not include related activities performed by such enterprise by an independent
contractor. . • •
29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1964).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1964).
16. CCH LAB. L. REP. (I WAGES&: HoURS) 1 25,185 (1967).
17. See Brief for Plaintiff State of Maryland at 26-27. Some legislators raised this
question of constitutionality during discussions of the 1961 and 1966 amendments
[S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1961); 2 U.S. CODE CoNG. &: AD. NEWS 1689-94
(1961)], but apparently their objections were not considered serious.
18. Wirtz v. Edisto Farms Dairy, 242 F. Supp. I (D.S.C. 1965) (holding that dairy
products purchasers, producers, and distributors constituted an enterprise engaged
in interstate commerce within the meaning of the FLSA and that retail route helpers,
not being otherwise exempt, were covered by the minimum wage and overtime provisions); Goldberg v. Ed's Shopworth Supermarket, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 781 (D. La. 1963)
(holding that a retail grocery store was within the provisions of the FLSA by virtue
of its receipt of a sufficient volume of goods which had travelled in interstate commerce). In neither of these cases did the courts make a conclusive determination of
the constitutionality of the "enterprise" concept. They merely concluded that the
defendants had failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality. Rejection of
the claims of invalidity was based upon the failure of the defendants to show that
the employees held to have been covered did not affect commerce; it was not based
upon a broad approval of the enterprise concept. The court in the principal case
converted these inconclusive decisions into authoritative precedent.
19. Principal case at 836.
20. 29 u.s.c. § 160 (1964).
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Labor Relations Board has been given jurisdiction over labor disputes which "affect commerce" and thus has been vested with the
fullest jurisdiction constitutionally permissible under the commerce
clause.21 Existing precedents under the NLRA hold that Congress
has the power to regulate the labor relations of local businesses which
directly or indirectly affect interstate commerce whether or not
individual employees affect commerce.22 The court found that Congress could similarly regulate the wages and hours of employees without regard to whether the employees themselves directly engage in
interstate commerce. However, this analogy seems somewhat inappropriate because the statutory basis of coverage under the NLRA
is the effect that the disruption of the employment relationship
might have on interstate commerce. To determine whether the requisite effect exists in NLRA cases courts often refer to the volume of
the employer's interstate business which is, or might be, withdrawn
from interstate commerce as a result of a strike or other interference.23 In adopting the 1961 amendments, Congress did not base the
extended coverage of the FLSA on the fact that the employment relationship "affected commerce"; rather it focused upon the connection of individual employees with interstate commerce as the determinant of whether an enterprise falls within the Act. It is the connection of two or more employees engaged in interstate commerce
21. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Corp., 371 U.S. 224 (1963). Similarly, the FLSA was
designed to cope with substandard labor conditions which "lead to labor disputes."
29 u.s.c. § 202 (1964).
22. In many cases arising under the NLRA, the Supreme Court has sustained NLRB
jurisdiction over a particular employer or an entire labor dispute found to affect
commerce even though individual employees or isolated incidents did not meet the
test. For example, in NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Corp., 371 U.S. 224 (1963), the Court
upheld NLRB jurisdiction over unfair labor practices committed by a retail distrib•
utor of fuel oil, where the retailer had obtained the oil from a wholesaler who brought
it in from another state. See also Plumbers Union v. Door County, 359 U.S. 354
(1958); Howell Chevrolet Co. v. NLRB, 346 U.S. 483 (1953); NLRB v. Denver Bldg.
Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643
(1944). Under these rulings, the NLRB is deemed to have jurisdiction to regulate the
acts of the employer toward each of his employees without regard to whether the
employee himself has satisfied the requisite jurisdictional test. All of the employer's
employment relationships are thus subject to regulation so long as his business affects
commerce.
23. Jurisdiction of the NLRB has repeatedly been sustained even in cases where
the amount of out-of-state goods used by the local businesses was strikingly small in
value. See, e.g., United States v. Ricciardi, 357 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 942 (1966) (jurisdiction over superintendents of small apartment buildings which
annually spent from $1,200 to $4,500 for fuel originating out of state upheld);
NLRB v. Inglewood Park Cemetery Ass'n, 355 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1966) (jurisdiction
over operation of a cemetery which expended $3,000 on out-of-state purchases during
one year upheld); NLRB v. Aurora City Lines, Inc., 299 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1962) (juris•
diction sustained over the operation of a local bus company which locally purchased
$2,000 worth of materials originating outside the state); NLRB v. Stoller, 207 F.2d
305 (9th Cir. 1953) (jurisdiction over operation of dry cleaning establishment which
annually purchased some $12,000 worth of soap, cleaning solvent, and paper originat•
ing out-of-state upheld.)
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which establishes whether an enterprise is covered, and not the volume of interstate goods sent or received by the business unit. 24 As
mentioned, once an enterprise is found to be covered, all the employees in that enterprise are subject to the provisions of the Act
whether or not they would be individually covered. 215
Putting aside the NLRA analogy, it seems doubtful that an
"enterprise" satisfies the constitutional standard of "affecting commerce" merely because two of its employees are "engaged" in commerce, despite the far-reaching decisions extending the scope of the
commerce power.26 Indeed, one court has expressed such a doubt:
[I]n considering the fact that [the definition of "enterprise" in the
FLSA] sets no standard for the number of employees who must be
engaged in interstate commerce before an enterprise is deemed to
engage in interstate commerce, it appears that the statute does go
far towards invading the field of intrastate commerce where the
provisions of the Act should not be effective.27

The discussion above assumes that "enterprise" means a business
unit taken as a whole. It may be possible to avoid the constitutional
problems, however, by viewing "enterprise" as a term of art meaning something less than the entire business unit. The Act defines
"enterprise" as follows: " 'Enterprise' means the related activities performed (either through unified operation or common control) by any
person or persons for a common business purpose . . . .''28 And, a
covered enterprise is, of course, one "which has employees engaged
in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce." 29 It is
possible to argue that "related activities ... for a common business
purpose" may refer to less than the entire business unit in some instances. For example, in a business in which some employees are
24. See text accompanying notes 15 &: 16 supra. It should be noted that § 203(s)
provides that certain enterprises must meet specified "dollar-tests." These provisions
merely impose a limit on the coverage of the FLSA once it is determined that the
enterprise falls under FLSA's commerce test. The individual employee's connection
with interstate commerce is the key to determining enterprise coverage which is then
limited by the dollar volume of the business.
25. See generally BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE NEW "WAGE AND HOUR I.Aw
(1961); CCH LAB. L. REP. (1 WAGES &: HOURS) 1[ 25,185 (1967) for definitive treatments
of the 1961 amendments and their application. The following legislative reports deal
with the scope of the amendments: S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H.R.
REP. No. 75, 87th Cong, 1st Sess. (1961); H.R. REP. No. 327, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961)
(Conference Report to accompany H.R. 3935).
26. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942);
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942). Wickard v. Filburn, where
the Court held that a farmer's consumption of wheat raised on his own farm substantially affected interstate commerce so as to bring him within the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, represents one of the most extreme examples of the reach of the
commerce power.
27. Wirtz v. Edisto Farms Dairy, 242 F. Supp. I, 5 (D.S.C. 1965).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 20!1(r) (1964); see note 14 supra and accompanying text.
29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 20!1(r) &: (s) (1964); see notes 15 &: 16 supra and accompanying text.
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"engaged in commerce," an enterprise may be comprised only of
these employees plus other employees of the business whose activities
are "related" to those of the employees engaged in commerce.30 In
such a situation, the "related" employees may well be said to be engaged in activities which "affect commerce," albeit indirectly. Their
work, after all, is necessary to the successful performance of jobs by
employees engaged in commerce; should they cease working, the
work of the employees engaged in commerce might be rendered
either more difficult or nugatory. 31 Under this narrowed definition
of "enterprise," FLSA coverage could be sustained as a matter of
constitutional principle, since every employee in the "enterprise" by
definition "affects" commerce by virtue of his relation to those engaged in commerce. In most cases, all employees in a business unit
would be included in the FLSA "enterprise" because they would be
performing activities related to those of the employees engaged in
commerce. In those rare cases where employees in a business unit
might not be sufficiently related to those engaged in commerce, they
would not be in the "enterprise" and hence not covered. Thus, it
would be impossible for an employee who does not affect commerce
to be regulated, and the states' contention that it might be possible
would be clearly without merit.
Although the "enterprise" concept may be considered constitutionally valid under a proper construction of the statute, there
still remains the more troublesome and more fundamental problem
of whether Congress has the power to extend the coverage of the
FLSA, or any other regulatory scheme enacted under the commerce
clause, to public schools, hospitals, or other state activities. In the
1966 amendments, Congress specifically included such state-operated
institutions as "enterprises," thus bringing these theretofore excluded
activities within the wage and hour provisions,32 and for the first
30. For an interpretation of what constitutes "related activities" under § 203(r), see
CCH LAB. L. REP. (1 WAGES & HoURS) ~ 25,185 (1967).
31. This approach seems to be supported by, although not expressly set forth in,
an example given by Judge Winter in the principal case at 836:
It is a matter of elementary logic that the hospital and the school function as
a result of the sum of all of the activities of all of their employees. The hospital
administrator or the superintendent of education (himself exempt from the provisions of the Act), or his secretary, or some other employees, would have no
occasion to engage in commerce, or the production of goods in commerce, if the
services of the employees covered by the Act under the 1966 Amendments were
permanently withdrawn. Their services are essential to the operation of the hospital or the school and, hence, their activities, although local in nature, substantially affect commerce, so that Congress may regulate the minimum wages to be
paid them as well as the maximum hours they may be required to work without
payment of overtime.
Such an approach is in accordance with prior Supreme Court decisions that congressional power over commerce extends to employees whose activities are related to but
not directly part of interstate commerce. See, e.g., Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679,
684 (1945); Walton v. Southern Package Corp., 320 U.S. 540 (1944).
32. This result was accomplished by the amendment of the statutory definition of
"employer" to eliminate the existing exclusion of states and their political subdivisions
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time attempting directly to regulate a state activity by federal legislation.33 In the principal case, two of the three judges on the panel
held the application of the minimum wage provisions to state activities constitutional, although each of the three judges took a different position on the validity of the extension of the overtime proso far as they engaged in the operation of schools, hospitals, and related institutions.
29 U.S.C § 203(d) (Supp. II, 1967). The definitions of "enterprise" and "enterprise
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" were accordingly
modified. They extend enterprise coverage to hospitals, nursing homes, and schools,
regardless of whether public or private or whether operated for profit or not for
profit, where the requisite commerce test is met, that is, where the enterprise has
"employees engaged in commerce, in the production of goods for commerce, or in handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods that have been moved in or produced
for commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) &: (s) (Supp. II, 1967). See note 25 supra and accompanying text. The amendments did not, however, purport to bring all employees of
state-operated enterprises within the FLSA. Rather they extended the white collar
exemption so as to exclude from coverage executive, administrative, and professional
employees, such as teachers and academic administrative personnel. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(2)
(Supp. II, 1967). In addition, certain partial exemptions to the overtime provisions
were given to hospitals and nursing homes. 29 U.S.C. §§ 207G), 213 (Supp. II, 1967).
The apparent impetus to the enactment of the 1966 amendments was the desire
of Congress to broaden coverage of the FLSA in response to presidential recommendation. U.S. CODE CONG. &: AD. NEWS 9 (1965); PRESIDENT'S ECONOMIC REPORT TO CONGRESS, Ill CONG. REc. 1402 (1965); SPECIAL MEssAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, Ill CONG.
REc. 10,399 (1965). The congressional committee reports reveal that of the 60 million
wage and salary workers in the United States, including some 9.5 million public employees, less than half were covered by the existing law. H.R. REP. No. 1366, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 7 (1966); S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966). The effect
of the 1966 amendments was to protect an additional 5.8 million private employees
and 1.4 million public employees. The added coverage for public schools, hospitals
and related institutions, and local transit systems was provided on the basis of congressional belief that employees of such enterprises are as much in need of a minimum standard of living as workers employed in private industry and that in several
areas public employees were not receiving sufficient compensation to enable them to
maintain such a standard. See 112 CONG. REc. 10,820-21 (daily ed. May 5, 1966); Hearings on H.R. 8259 Before the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
pt. I, at 429-30, 449, 455 (1955),
33. It has been the traditional congressional policy to exclude state employees
engaged in certain state activities from the coverage of legislation embodying social
welfare objectives. See, e.g., Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301,
3306(c)(7) (1964); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, 152(2) (1964); Equal
Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e{b) (1964). In addition, social security
legislation excludes the states as covered employers. 26 U.S.C. § 312I(b)(7) (1964); 42
U.S.C, § 410(a)(7) (1964).
However, in 1942 an organ of the federal government-the National War Labor
Board-did consider the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to oversee labor disputes
between state employees and their governmental employers, and determined that no
jurisdiction existed. National War Labor Board, Cases Nos. 47, 726 (Dec. 23, 1942),
reported in c. H. RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE LAw 226 (1946).
The decision was based on the notion that a state has undisputed power to regulate
the working hours and compensation of its employees: "[A]ny directive order of
the National '\Var Labor Board which purported to regulate the wages, working
hours, or the conditions of employment of state or municipal employees would constitute a clear invasion of the sovereign rights of the political subdivisions of local
state government." It is noteworthy that this decision was reached after the decisions
in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), and NLRB v. Jones &: Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1936).
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visions to these state activities.34 Since the decision in the principal
case adds judicial sanction to direct federal control over state functions, it assumes landmark proportions. The implications of the
decision may well signal the need for a reinterpretation of the scope
of Congress' power under the commerce clause.35
The plaintiff states initially argued that the operation of public
schools and hospitals is purely "local" and hence not "interstate
commerce" within the meaning of the commerce clause.36 However,
despite popular thinking which views schools and hospitals as carrying on activities peculiarly "local" in nature, the "interstate" nature
of such activities can be easily demonstrated. There can be little
doubt that school and hospital expenditures for supplies and equipment generate a substantial fl.ow of goods in interstate commerce.31
34. Judge Winter deemed the amendments constitutional both as to the minimum
wage and the overtime provisions on the theory that the operation of schools and
hospitals exerted a substantial effect upon interstate commerce and thus was within
the reach of the federal commerce power. Principal case at 832, 836-37. Chief Judge
Thomsen, concurring in the result as to the minimum wage provisions, conceded
that the operation of schools and hospitals by the states may affect interstate commerce to a substantial degree; nevertheless, he went on to rest his decision upon the
theory that an application of the Fl.SA to the states did not "seriously interfere with
the state's performance or regulation of its indispensable sovereigu functions." Principal case at 850. Applying this latter test to the overtime provisions, however, Judge
Thomsen concluded that they "probably" go beyond constitutionally permissible
limits with respect to some if not all of the covered employees. He would have permitted the states to challenge the overtime provisions on a case-by-case basis, thus
allowing the court in each case to determine if impermissible undue interference
with sovereign state functions existed. Principal case at 851-52. A similar "undue
interference" test was utilized by Judge Northrop in reaching the conclusion that
the extension of both the minimum wage and overtime provisions to the states is
unconstitutional. Principal case at 852-53. As a result of this division in the court,
the reasoning of the concurring and dissenting opinions, while not leading to the
same result, actually constitutes the majority rationale. See generally Recent Decision,
A Balancing Test for the Commerce Power?, 56 GEO. L.J. 392 (1968); Comment, Constitutional Law-Fair Labor Standards Act-1966 Amendments Extending Coverage
to Certain Employees of State Public Schools, Hospitals, and Related Institutions Held
Constitutional, 43 NoTRE DAME I.Aw. 414 (1968).
35. Although the principal case is the first case in which a court has been squarely
presented with express regulation of the states under the commerce clause, consideration of the problem of intergovernmental immunity as a limitation on the exercise of
federal powers other than the taxing power is by no means new. See cases cited in
note 43 infra. See also Recent Decision, Constitutional Law-Intergovernmental Immunities-Statutory Construction-Applicability of Price Control Legislation to Sales
by States, 45 MICH. L. REv. 94 (1946) (noting Case v. Bowles); Note, State Sovereignty
as a Limitation Upon the Federal Commerce Power, 45 YALE L.J. 1118 (1936) (noting
United States v. California).
36. Brief for Plaintiff State of Maryland at 13-22.
37. During fiscal year 1967 an estimated $38.3 billion was spent by the nation's
state and local public educational and medical institutions. In fiscal year 1965 state
and local authorities spent some $3.9 billion in the operation of public hospitals.
The stipulations of the plaintiff states indicate that substantial portions of these
amounts are expended to purchase supplies and equipment in the interstate market.
Thus, in Maryland, 87% of the $8 million spent in 1965 for supplies and equipment
for use in the public schools involved direct interstate purchases, and over 55% of its
hospital purchases were for out-of-state goods, In Ohio 42% of the total of $9 million
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Thus, all three judges in the principal case agreed that state operation of schools and hospitals "affected" commerce and could be regulated under the commerce power as traditionally defined. 88 One
spent by Ohio's six state universities on certain supplies during 1966 were purchased
directly out of state, and an undetermined portion had been manufactured out of
state. Information provided by Texas similarly shows that almost all textbooks originate outside of the state, and that "the major portion" of drugs and hospital equipment is either purchased directly from out-of-state concerns, or at least manufactured
in other states. It is noteworthy that the interstate flow of school and hospital supplies
is necessitated by the limited geographical distribution of manufacturers of such goods.
There are, for example, no Maryland suppliers for fourteen out of eighteen major
categories of school supplies and equipment, including textbooks, teaching tools and
audio-visual aids, science equipment, and physical education equipment. Even some
of the larger states, such as Ohio and Texas, have few producers of such essential
commodities. Principal case at 833-34; Reply Brief of Defendant at 2-4; Brief of the
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees as Amicus Curiae
at 3-4.
In addition, it is well established that actual shipment of goods across state lines
is "interstate" and not "local," and it has been held that goods so shipped need not
be tangible, but can consist of "ideas, wishes, orders and intelligence." Western Union
v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490 (1945). Under this concept, the preparation of written documents and other materials for out-of-state transmission, as well as the actual transmission of funds, documents and other communications, seemingly can be classified
as "interstate commerce." Several cases in fact have held that employees engaged in
the preparation of written documents and other materials for interstate transmission
or in the actual interstate transmission of such documents, communications, and funds
are within the coverage of the FLSA. See, e.g., Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Wirtz, 346
F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1965); Willmark Service System, Inc. v. Wirtz, 317 F.2d 486 (8th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 897 (1963); Public Bldg. Authority v. Goldberg, 298
F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1962); Mitchell v. Kroger Co., 248 F.2d 935 (8th Cir. 1957); Aetna
Fin. Co. v. Mitchell, 247 F.2d 190 (1st Cir. 1957).
Applying these concepts to state-operated schools and hospitals, Judge Winter
reasoned that the preparation and exchange of documents in connection with various
federal aid programs is sufficient to support a finding that "public schools and hospitals are directly engaged in commerce and the production of goods for commerce."
Principal case at 834. The significance of the notion that the mere interchange of
communications with the federal government is sufficient to put one "in commerce"
is readily apparent. If that is the rule it can well be wondered what, if anything, is
not interstate commerce.
38. See note 34 supra. The traditional bounds of congressional power under the
commerce clause have undergone comprehensive treatment by other authorities and
will not be re-considered here. See, e.g., Barnett, Ten Years of the Supreme Co~rt:
1937-1947-Power To Regulate Commerce, 41 AM. PoL. SCI. REv. 1170 (1947); Fallon,
The Commerce Clause From the Schechter Case Through the 1944-45 Term, 19 TEMP.
L.Q. 421 (1946); Green, Some Heretical Remarks on the Federal Power Over Commerce, 31 MINN. L. R.Ev. 121 (1947); Light, The Federal Commerce Power, 49 VA. L.
REv. 717 (1963); Stem, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 59 HARv.
L. R.Ev. 645, 883 (1946). It is sufficient for present purposes to note that the battle
over the power of Congress to regulate activities "affecting" commerce, which culminated in the decision in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), was fought almost
exclusively between the states and the federal government insofar as each claimed
the power to regulate particular private activities. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones 8: Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
Under the "substantial effect" test developed in these early cases, any activity which
"substantially" affects or burdens interstate commerce may be regulated even though the
activity itself is considered "local" in nature and even though the effect of a particular
individual engaging in the activity is trivial. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Whether the effect of the activity is
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judge, having arrived at this conclusion, said that the inquiry need
go no further since the congressional power under the commerce
clause is "plenary," and the regulation of any activity, including
that of a state, which affects commerce is constitutional.39 However,
the concurring and dissenting judges argued that in spite of the fact
that the Supreme Court has yet to distinguish governmental from
private activity in defining the scope of the commerce power,40 the
constitutional inquiry should not stop with a mechanistic application of the "substantial effect" test; a perfunctory recital of the
"direct" or "indirect" is immaterial so long as the effect is "substantial." NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra. Furthermore, the particular activity need not
be "commercial" or conducted for profit. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Powell v. United States Cartage Co., 339 U.S.
497 (1950); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Brooks v. United States, 267
U.S. 432 (1925).
Only a handful of cases involved issues arising from the fact that state operations
came within the regulatory ambit of a generally applicable federal commerce statute.
See cases cited in note 43 infra. These cases are more fully analyzed hereinafter in
connection with their value as precedent for sustaining the 1966 amendments. See
notes 43-58 infra and accompanying text.
Although it is thus evident that, through their operation of schools and hospitals,
the states "affect commerce," it is not so clear how, through noncompliance with the
federal minimum wage or maximum hour standards, state operation of schools, hospitals, mental institutions, reformatories, and so forth, would constitute "unfair methods of competition" which "burden commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce"; cause the channels of commerce to be used to "spread and perpetuate
substandard labor conditions"; lead to labor disputes; or "interfere with the orderly
and fair marketing of goods in commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 202 (Supp. II, 1967). See Brief
for Plaintiff State of Texas at 24; Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement in the United
States Supreme Court at 27-29.
39. Judge Winter, principal case at 832. Judge Winter explicitly rejected the notion
that the nature of our federal system imposes any limitation on Congress' power
under the commerce clause: "The specific and peremptory rejection of the argument
that the principle of duality in our system of government may limit in any way the
authority of Congress to regulate commerce is dispositive of the present case." Principal case at 840 [citing Board of Trustees of University of llinois v. United States,
289 U.S. 48 (1933)].
It should be noted that even accepting the application of the FLSA to these state
activities, public schools and hospitals may be "ultimate consumers" within the
statutory definition of "goods," and therefore excluded from the FLSA's provisions. 29
U.S.C. § 203(i) (Supp. II, 1967). Under this theory, which was asserted by Maryland
and Texas in the district court, the public hospitals and schools of the states are the
ultimate consumers of all materials, supplies, and equipment utilized in their operations. Their employees, as employees of an ultimate consumer, would not be covered
since by definition "goods" do not include goods after their delivery to the ultimate
consumer. See Brief for Plaintiff State of Maryland at 58-66; Brief for Plaintiff State
of Texas at 31-33; Jurisdictional Statement in the United States Supreme Court at
35-37, 40-42. Since this argument is one of statutory construction, the district court,
in confining itself to the constitutional issue, held that it would be more properly
asserted in a suit involving the application of the FLSA to an individual school or
enterprise. Principal case at 831. This issue is being included in the appeal being
taken by the states to the Supreme Court.
40. See, e.g., California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957); California v. United States,
320 U.S. 577 (1944); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). In United States v.
California, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument that the power to regulate state activities under the commerce clause depends upon whether those activities
are governmental or proprietary in nature. 297 U.S. at 183.

February 1968]

Recent Developments

761

plenary nature of the commerce power thus should not be used to
sustain automatically a direct regulation of activities undertaken
by the states, but rather should entail consideration of the practical
effects which the federal regulation would have upon the operation
of state govemments.41 Both of these judges agreed that the commerce power, rather than being absolute, is subject to a limitation
similar to that applied to the federal taxing power, which is limited
to the extent that it "unduly interferes" with a state's performance
of its sovereign functions. 42
Any conclusion that the commerce power is inherently limited
must distinguish a number of past cases which have held that state
activities can indeed be subject to federal commerce clause regulation.43 The two judges in the principal case who put forth the
inherent limitation theory merely dismissed these strong precedents
with the observation that "in none of those cases were the essential
taxing and budgetary functions so seriously affected as by the statute
under consideration" in this case.44 Closer scrutiny of those cases
presents a clearer and more meaningful distinction. This distinction
rests upon the notion that the commerce clause is not a source of
undifferentiated power applicable to any given state activity which
41. See note 34 supra.
42. Id.
43. The cases upholding federal commerce clause regulation of certain state activities are Parden v. Terminal R.R. of Alabama Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (state
operating a railroad in interstate commerce held liable to suit under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act); California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957) (Federal Railway
Labor Act held applicable to a state in its capacity as railroad employer engaged in the
operation of a belt-line railroad even though congressional policy of promoting collective bargaining conflicted with the state's civil service laws); California v. United
States, 320 U.S. 577 (1944) (order of the Federal Maritime Commission directing a
state and a municipality to limit free wharfage time and to observe prescribed minimum prices for their services in operating waterfront terminals upheld); United States
v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) (holding that the state by engaging in interstate
commerce by rail subjected itself to the requirements of the Federal Safety Appliance
Act so as to be liable for penalties for statutory violations); Board of Trustees of
University of Illinois v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933) (imposition of a federal
customs duty on scientific apparatus imported by a state university for educational
purposes upheld as a valid exercise of Congress' "plenary and exclusive" power to
regulate foreign commerce); Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925) (state
sanitary district enjoined from diverting water from Lake Michigan in excess of that
authorized by the Secretary of War under a statute prohibiting alterations and
obstructions in the navigable capacity of the Great Lakes waters).
In a more recent case, United States v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 9 (1966), rev'g per curiam
354 F.2d 549 (1965), a state was held liable to the United States for penalties under
the 1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act for growing wheat on state-owned prison farms
in excess of federally imposed acreage allotments. This decision is distinguishable
from the cases above in that the federal statute that was applied to the state activity
did not concern control of an instrumentality of commerce. For a fuller discussion,
see text accompanying notes 60 and 61 infra. See also Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92
· (1946), a case arising under the war power, where a state was enjoined from selling
school-land timber at prices in excess of the maximum price prescribed by the OPA
under the authority of the Emergency Price Control Act.
44. Principal case at 848.
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may come within its ambit; rather, it should be considered a hybrid
power containing both a plenary and a nonplenary component.415
Thus, there are areas which demand a plenary exercise of power
in order to effectuate a constitutional objective requiring a unified
national perspective, but there are also areas where the permissible
extent of federal power over state activities is limited by the constitutionally recognized sovereignty and integrity of the states.46
Although this dual aspect of the commerce power has never
been explicitly enunciated, it seems to be entirely in keeping with
prior cases decided under the commerce clause. The plenary aspect
of Congress' power to control commerce can best be seen in cases
upholding the validity of federal regulation of states and their political subdivisions in the area of foreign commerce. United action in
the field of foreign commerce was undeniably one of the prime reasons for the establishment of a strong national government.47 Thus,
it has been recognized that in problems of international relations
a principle of federalism is not operative; 48 rather, a federal, instead
of a state, perspective is constitutionally required so that a necessarily
national policy applicable to the country as a whole can be established.49 In this respect, then, the commerce power is "plenary" and
may be exercised to control state as well as private activities irrespective of the sovereign character of the states, just as the federal
government's war and treaty powers are exercised. 50
In like manner, there seem to be classes of interstate commerce
45. But see 2 J. STORY, COMMENT.ARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION §§ 1067-68 (5th ed.
1891) (suggesting that the commerce clause grants a power that is a "uniform whole'1,
46. This analytical framework is suggested by the following passage from Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, at 194-95 (1824):
The genius and character of the whole government seems to be that its action
is to be applied to all external concerns which affect the states generally; but not
to those which are completely within a particular state, which do not affect the
states generally, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose
of executing some of the general powers of the government.
47. See, e.g., 2 STORY, supra note 45, § 1058:
Those who felt the injury arising from • • • [the oppressed and degraded state
of commerce prior to the adoption of the Constitution] ••• perceived the necessity of giving the control over this important subject to a single government.
It is not, therefore, a matter of surprise, that the grant should be as extensive
as the mischief, and should comprehend all foreign commerce . . • •
48. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. United States 289 U.S. 48 (1933),
where the Court held that the principle of state immunity has no application to
duties imposed on the exercise of the power to regulate foreign commerce.
49. Id. at 59: "In international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse
and trade the people of the United States act through a single government with unified
and adequate national power." (Emphasis added.) See Johnson, When the Importer Is
a State University, May the Government Collect a Duty?, 27 MICH. L. R.Ev. 499 (1929).
See also Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925) (holding that the Attorney
General of the United States could secure an injunction against the Sanitary District
of Chicago to prevent it from obstructing foreign and interstate commerce by diverting
a volume of water from Lake Michigan in excess of that allowed by federal statute).
50. Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946); Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S.
405 (1925).
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problems as to which the Constitution requires that the federal government have plenary power to formulate a rule applicable to the
country as a whole.151 One such class seems to be the control of the
highways and instrumentalities of commerce. Here, the objective
which justifies federal supremacy through an exercise of a plenary
commerce power without regard to state sovereignty is maintenance
of the free movement of goods, an objective which can be achieved
in the context of conflicting state interests only by a paramount
federal power.112 In fact, it is in this area of interstate commerce that
the courts have always upheld federal regulation of state-owned and
-operated facilities. Thus, state-run railroads, port facilities, and the
like have been held subject to federal regulation under the commerce clause.113 This objective is not merely one of national legislative policy, but involves a "prime purpose" for which the federal
government was created. 54
In contrast to this plenary aspect, there seems to be an area of
interstate commerce in which a complete federal power is neither
constitutionally commanded nor constitutionally contemplated. 55
51. See, e.g., Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 102 (1946), where the Court talked of a
"prime purpose of the Federal Government's establishment." The commerce power
itself was granted in order to vest the federal government with the power to deal
with the chaotic condition of American domestic trade under the Articles of Confederation and embodies a constitutional objective of eliminating "the mutual jealousies and aggressions of the States, taking form in customs barriers and other economic
retaliation." Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1934). See also Polar Ice Cream &:
Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 378 (1964); 2 STORY, supra note 45, § 1066.
52. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Chicago, B. &: Q. R.R., 257 U.S. 563 (1922) (holding federal control over intrastate railroad rates essential to maintaining an adequate
national railway system). See also Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911);
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
1 (1824). A broad range of federal statutes dealing with the actual channels of interstate commerce have been enacted by Congress in order to effectuate this constitututional purpose. See, e.g., Federal Power Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-25r (1964)
(transmission and sale of electric energy); Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-17w
(transportation and sale of natural gas) (1964); Motor Carrier Act of 1939 (now Part
II of Interstate Commerce Act) 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1964) (motor carriers); Interstate
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 901-23 (1964) (water carriers); Federal Aviation Act of
1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1964) (air carriers).
53. E.g., Parden v. Terminal R.R. of Alabama Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964);
California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957); California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577
(1944); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). (See abstracts of these cases
in note 43 supra). Other types of cases included in this category of commerce are
those dealing with the navigable waterways which interfere with but do not directly
regulate state activities. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508 (1941) (holding
constitutional a federal act authorizing the construction of a dam on nonnavigable
waters that would flood state-owned land used for schools, a prison farm, and highways
and bridges and would interfere with the state's own program of water development
and conservation).
54. Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 102 (1964). See note 51 supra.
55. At times it has been suggested in dicta that the scope of Congress' power to
regulate interstate commerce is not as broad as the power to control foreign commerce.
Thus, the dissenting opinion in the Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 373-74 (1903) stated:
It is argued that the power to regulate commerce among the several States is the
same as the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and with the Indian
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This area would seem to include congressional regulation of activities which merely "affect" commerce, as opposed to the regulation of
activities concerned with the actual transportation of goods across
state lines-that is, the regulation of activities which "affect" commerce, as opposed to the regulation of activities which are commerce.
Examples of the types of activity in this area of commerce are labor
disputes and the maintenance of substandard labor conditions, both
of which Congress has found to interfere with or burden the free
flow of goods in commerce. 56 Yet, in both cases, the finding of interference with interstate commerce merely served as the basis to
support social legislation which was not necessarily related to commerce clause objectives. In other words, the element of constitutional objective is purely incidental, if not fictitious, and is utilized
only to justify the legislation constitutionally; the furtherance of
legislative social policy is the paramount objective. The issue in the
principal case appears to be of this type, since it does not involve
the need for unfettered operation of instrumentalities of commerce57
or any other such matter of constitutional purpose, but rather entails a legislative policy against substandard labor conditions and
Congress' attempt to deal with these conditions under the aegis of
the commerce clause. This element of legislative policy, rather than
constitutional objective, serves to distinguish the principal case from
previous cases subjecting states to federal regulation under the commerce clause and indeed seems to distinguish the nonplenary aspect
of the power over interstate commerce from its plenary aspect. 58
tribes. But is its scope the same? ••. [T]he power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and the power to regulate interstate commerce, are to be taken diverso
intuitu, for the latter was intended to secure quality and freedom in commercial
intercourse as between the States, not to permit the creation of impediments to
such intercourse; while the former clothed Congress with that power over international commerce, pertaining to a sovereign nation in its intercourse with for•
eign nations, and subject, generally speaking, to no implied or reserved power
in the States. The laws which would be necessary and proper in the one case,
would not be necessary or proper in the other.
See also Brolan v. United States, 236 U.S. 216, 222 (1915). However, there have also been
dicta to the contrary: that the interstate aspect of Congress' power to control commerce
is as plenary as its foreign commerce power. See, e.g., License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
504, 578 (1874); Pittsburgh &: C. Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U.S. 577, 587 (1895). Treating the interstate commerce power as a hybrid as suggested in the text would, of
course, accommodate both views. See generally LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA-ANALYSIS AND INTERPRE•
TATION 155-57 (1964).

56. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1964); Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1964). See note 38 supra.
57. See note 2 supra.
58. This distinction is suggested by the following passage from THE FEDERALIST
No. 31, at 199 (H. Dawson ed. 1863) (Hamilton):
[A]s the plan of the Convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation,
the State Governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they
before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United
States. This exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of State sovereignty,
wonld exist only in three cases: where the Constitution in express terms granted
an exclusive authority to the Union; where it granted in one instance an au-
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Although it is well-recognized that the federal government has
power to regulate private activities which "affect" commerce, 59 no
case has held that state activities can be constitutionally regulated
in a like manner. One decision, United States v. Ohio, 60 has held
an activity of a state government amenable to a federal statute enacted under the commerce clause merely because that activity "affected commerce." This case, however, did not raise the basic issue
of whether such an act could constitutionally be applied to a state,
but merely decided that the state activity came within the statute's
jurisdictional standard. 61 Thus, there is no authority for the proposition that, as a matter of constitutional law, activities of state governments which do not directly involve the operation of an instrumentality of commerce, but which merely "affect" commerce, are
amenable to federal regulation under the commerce clause.
Rather than compelling federal supremacy in all such cases, it
is possible that the Constitution allows for an adjustment of competing federal and state interests with a view to preserving the effectiveness of both governments. Unless the states are to be rendered
mere administrative units, there must be an intrinsic limitation on
the commerce power arising from the constitutionally recognized
identity and sovereignty of the states and from the practical necessities engendered by the existence of two sovereign governments
within one geographical area. 62 Since our federal scheme of governthority to the Union, and in another prohibited the States from exercising the
like authority; and where it granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar
authority in the States would be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant. I use these terms to distinguish this last case from another which might
appear to resemble it, but which would, in fact, be essentially different: I mean
where the exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction might be productive of occasional
interferences in the policy of any branch of administration, but would not imply
any direct contradiction or repugnancy in point of constitutional authority. [Emphasis added]
The distinction between a constitutional objective and a legislative policy is not
always easy to make, since the legislative policy and the exercise of power to accomplish it may often be justified in terms of constitutional purpose. Thus, the FLSA,
which expresses a legislative policy against substandard labor conditions and is a
public welfare measure, is justified in the legislative findings as a measure designed to
accomplish the constitutional objective of eliminating burdens and obstructions on the
free flow of goods in commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (Supp. II, 1967).
59. Congress thus far has been deemed to have exclusive control over private
activities which affect commerce (see articles cited in note 38 supra), not, however,
because of a constitutional imperative, but because courts have found no compelling
reasons to allow a state to control private activities when the federal government has
acted in the area.
60. 385 U.S. 9 (1966).
61. The Agricultural Adjustment Act is intended to apply to wheat producers when
their wheat could be said to exert a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. 7 U.S.C. §§ ll!0l(a)(3) &: (4), 1331 (1964).
62. The expansion of the federal commerce power since the 1930's has caused some
commentators to wonder whether there is any limit to the power which the federal
government can exercise under the aegis of the commerce clause and whether the
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ment necessarily implies restrictions on the exercise ol: all governmental power so as to preserve the integrity of its constituent units,
it would seem that the commerce power, perhaps like the taxing
power, 63 should be limited so that it cannot be utilized to destroy
state sovereignty. This notion of inherent limitation is in accord
with the principle of federalism embodied in the tenth amendment.
While the tenth amendment may not operate as an affirmative limitation upon federal power, it must at least guarantee tl:.e continued
vitality of the states as governmental units in a federal scheme if it
is to have any meaning at all. 64 Although such a limitation has yet
states can retain their vitality in the face of such power. See generally L. VvHITE, THE
STATES AND THE NATION (1953); Crampton, The Supreme Court and the Decline of
State Power, 2 J. LAw &: EcoN. 175 (1959); Cudlip, The Function oJ the States, 43
MICH. L. REY. 95 (1944); Fordham, The States in the Federal System--Vital Role or
Limbo?, 49 VA. L. REY. 666 (1963); Light, The Federal Commerce Pc•wer, 49 VA. L.
REY. 717 (1963). In fact, the fear that Congress was deliberately dimgarding its authority under the Constitution was early voiced by Woodrow WIison:
The old theory of the sovereignty of the States • • . has lost its Yitality • • • •
[T]he federal government is, through its courts, the final judge of its own powers
• • . • Its power is "to regulate commerce between the States," and the attempts
now made during every session of Congress to carry the implications of that
power beyond the utmost boundaries of reasonable and honest ir ference show
that the only limits likely to be observed by the politicians are these set by the
good sense and conservative temper of the country.
W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GoVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 178-79 (1908). The
precise role to be played by the states is not important for present purposes. What is
noteworthy is that the fact that there are areas of peculiarly local concern which the
Constitution leaves to the states has been recognized as a limitation 1lpon the unrestricted exercise of the commerce power, even in those cases which hl.ve contributed
significantly to the expansion of that power. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill
(1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones &: Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In the last mentioned case the essential probkm presented to
the Court was that of defining those private activities which are within the reach of
the federal commerce power and those which are of purely local concern and which
must be left to state regulation. It was in this context that the substantial effect test
developed and not in the context of cases dealing with the issue of which state activities may be constitutionally subjected to an exercise of federal power. See note 38
supra.
63. At least one commentator has suggested that this idea serves as a basis for making an analogy between the taxing power and the commerce power. Professor Charles
L. Black in PERSPECTIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 25, 30 (1963) states:
The Federal powers-over commerce, taxation, the post, the armed forces, the
currency, patents and copyrights, maritime affairs, and so on-can be used to coerce any result concerning any matter, however "local," unless an implied limitation (on Federal authority) exists, and the concept of a legally defined Federalism,
judicially implied, has then no substance •.••
The issue, rather, is whether the Federal system has any legal substance, any core
of constitutional right that the courts will enforce.
If it has not, but exists only at the sufference of Congress, that cardinal fact
should be recognized. The only viable alternative is the working out of a body of
doctrine stating limitations on Congress that are implied from the existence and
authority of the states.
64. The constitutional recognition of state governments does not mean that the
tenth amendment is to be viewed as an affirmative limitation on the powers of the
federal government. Such a view has been rejected consistently since the late 1930's.
Probably the most notable decision on this point is United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 123 (1941), in which the Supreme Court dismissed the tenth amendment as "but
a truism-that all is retained that has not been surrendered."
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to be placed upon the commerce power by any court, it would seem
to be supported by the statement of Justice Frankfurter in his opinion
in New York v. United States, 65 to the effect that "the power of
Congress to lay taxes has impliedly no less a reach than the power
of Congress to regulate commerce." 66 The suggestion that in some
respects the commerce power is coextensive with the taxing power
may indicate that the commerce power should be similarly limited
when its exercise upon the states has an impairing effect akin to that
which results from an exercise of the taxing power.
The basic issue in the principal case thus resolves itself into a
problem of defining those state activities which may be constitutionally regulated and those which may not. Analogizing to the test
under the taxing power, the appropriate test for determining which
state activities are regulable should consider the degree of impairment of state functions resulting from an exercise of the commerce
power upon the states. 67 This test is similar to the one suggested by
The tenth amendment does, however, buttress the argument for implying a principle of intergovernmental immunity inasmuch as it expressly declares what the seven
basic articles of the Constitution imply, namely, that the system of government they
establish was intended to preserve the integrity of the states and protect a certain
field of autonomy against federal encroachment. See United States v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322, 327-28 (1873) [quoted with approval by Justices Douglas
and Black, dissenting in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, at 593 (1946)]:
The right of the states to administer their own affairs through their legislative,
executive, and judicial departments, in their own manner through their own
agencies, is conceded by the uniform decisions of this court and by the practice of
the Federal government from its organization. • . • Their operation may be impeded and may be destroyed, if any interference is permitted.
See also Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868):
The preservation of the states and the maintenance of their governments are as
much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the
Union and the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution, in all
its provisions, looks to an indestructible union, composed of indestructible states.
65. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
66. Id. at 582.
67. Analogies to the taxing power cannot be readily dismissed by reference to broad
language in some opinions to the effect that the principle of intergovernmental immunity cannot operate as a limitation upon the power to regulate commerce. See, e.g.,
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). Cases in which such statements have
been made are distinguishable from the principal case. See notes 43-58 supra and
accompanying text. If some constitutional principle limits the federal government's
power to interfere with the sovereign functions of the states, that limitation, it would
seem, must apply with equal force to an exercise of the commerce power. All of Congress' powers are granted by the same section of the Constitution. U.S. CoNsr. art. I,
§ 8. Thus, there would seem that limitations on one power which are derived from
other provisions of the Constitution not specifically limited to that power should
similarly restrict all Congress' powers. See Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936), where the Court, in comparing the bankruptcy
power to the taxing power, stated at 530: "Both [powers] are granted by the same
section of the Constitution, and we find no reason for saying that one is impliedly
limited by the necessity of preserving independence of the States, while the other is
not." See also Note, State Sovereignty as a Limitation Upon the Federal Commerce
Power, 45 YALE L.J. 1118 (1936).
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Chief Justice Stone in New York v. United States as determinative
of the amenability of state activities to federal taxation, the basic
inquiry of which was whether the imposition of a nondiscriminatory
tax results in "a State ... being taxed so as unduly to infringe, in
some manner, the performance of its functions as a government
which the Constitution recognizes as sovereign." 68 The concurring
and dissenting judges in the principal case utilized a similar notion
in asserting that the appropriate test for determining: the permissibility of an exercise of the commerce power upon the states should
involve a balancing of the extent of interference with :indispensable
state functions against the effect that such functions have upon interstate commerce.69
Application of an "undue interference test," similar to the one
suggested in the taxing power cases,70 to the facts of the principal
case perhaps best demonstrates the necessity of implying a limitation
on the power over interstate commerce and illustrates the way in
which such a test would operate as a balancing device to resolve
the conflict of sovereignties resulting from an exercise of the federal
commerce power upon state activities. In determining the amenability of state-operated schools and hospitals to federal wage and
hour regulation, the possible frustration of federal wage and hour
policy arising from failure to regulate these activities s;1ould be balanced against the impact which application of the FLSA will have
upon the states. In assessing the extent of the frustration of federal
goals, it is necessary to consider the significance of the federal regu68. 326 U.S. 572, 587 (1946). Later in his opinion Chief Justice Stone reiterated
language he had previously used in Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523-24
(1926):
[T]he limitation upon the trucing power of each [the states and the federal government], so far as it affects the other, must receive a practical construction which
permits both to function with the minimum of interference with the other; and
that limitation cannot be so varied or extended as seriously to impair either the
trucing power of the government imposing the tax ••• or the appropriate exercise
of the functions of the government affected by it.
For earlier formulations of the idea of permitting both governments to function "with
a minimum of interference," see Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keffe, 306 U.S. 466
(1939); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938); Wilcutts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216
(1931); cases cited in note 70 infra.
69. Chief Judge Thomsen, concurring, phrased the applicable test as follows: "The
attempted exercise against a State of the power of the federal government over interstate commerce should face the test: does it interfere unduly with the State's performance of its sovereign and indispensable functions of government? If the concept of
federalism is to survive, it must stand on constitutional limitations, not on the sufferance of the federal government." Principal case at 849. Judge Norlhrop stated that
the test should be similar to the one suggested in Chief Justice Stone's opinion in
New York v. United States: "The question before us is whether this Congressional
exercise of power under the Commerce Clause constitutes an undue infringement upon
the 'performance of [the state's] function as a government which the Constitution recognizes as sovereign.' " Principal case at 853.
70. E.g., New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946); Helvering v. Powers, 293
U.S. 214 (1934); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 369 (1934); Metcalf v. Mitchell, 269 U.S.
514 (1926). See also note 68 supra.
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Iatory activities being attacked in relation to Congress' over-all
scheme of regulation and to ascertain whether alternative means of
achieving the same goals are available. Under the FLSA, Congress
has succeeded in regulating about 30 million of the 60 million wage
and salary workers in the United States. The 1966 amendments expanded this coverage, but included only some 1.4 million public
employees, many of whom are already receiving a wage at or above
the minimum wage prescribed by the Act. 71 Moreover, Congress has
alternative means of securing its objective of a minimum wage for
public employees: a scheme of conditional grants. Thus, the potential frustration of the federal minimum wage policy is minimal. On
the other side of the scale, a literal application of the statute72 with
increases in wages for covered employees, threatens to impose substantial and perhaps destructive financial burdens upon already
strained state budgets.73 For most states to meet these added costs,
it will be necessary for them either to curtail indispensable services
now being provided74 or to increase taxes, an alternative which,
71. See note 32 supra.
72. Opinions of the Wage-Hour Administrator indicate that the 1966 amendments
will be literally applied once their validity has been upheld. See CCH LAB. L. REP.
(2 WAGES &: HOURS} 111J 30,004, 30,006, 30,647 (1967).
73. It is estimated that a total of some $215 million in additional funds would be
needed to cover the increased expenses in the first year above. Brief of Plaintiff State
of Maryland at 5. Texas alleged that to meet the standards imposed by the FLSA, the
expenses of the Texas Youth Council would have to be increased S3 million annually;
the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation would require $7.5 million
more per year; institutions of higher learning would have additional costs of over
$3.25 million imposed on them annually; and the Fort Worth Independent School
District, which is merely one of 1,300 other Texas School Districts, would need additional tax revenues of $575,000 annually by 1971. Furthermore, some of these districts
have already reached their constitutional tax rates and property value limitations.
Brief for the State of Texas at 18; principal case at 851.
74. "Indispensable" as used here is not intended to be a mere euphemism for what
was formerly called an "essential" state function or a "governmental" function, but is
meant to cover state activities which cannot reasonably be supplied to the general
public unless the state undertakes them. For example, a substantial portion of available hospital facilities and care would probably be unavailable unless supplied by
the states. In Maryland, for example, state-provided beds constitute the only facilities
available for tubercular care in the state. Similarly, 90% of the facilities for the
mentally ill and defective in Maryland are provided by the state. In Texas nonstate hospital beds are virtually nonexistent and the few private facilities that do
exist arc extremely expensive. Similar conditions exist in other states. The primary
role played by the states in the area of education, of course, is well recognized. In
Maryland, Texas, and Ohio over 80% of the total number of secondary and elementary
school pupils are enrolled in public schools. Public institutions of higher education
serve 74% of the students enrolled in degree programs in Maryland, 77% in Texas, and
63% in Ohio. See principal case at 850. It should also be noted that public institutions
bear the main burden of caring for the indigent. These facts indicate the vital role that
the states play in providing needed facilities and services in response to the desires of
their citizens, a role which may become too burdensome when the federal government
is allowed to regulate a large portion of the costs of such activities. What has been said
in respect to schools and hospitals applies, of course, with equal force to the "related
institutions" covered by the 1966 amendments.
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even if politically feasible, may often be impossible since many of
the political subdivisions involved are already saddled with sizeable
debts and are taxing at their constitutional maximum.s.75
Also significant is the nature of the state activities being brought
within the ambit of congressional regulation. Certainly the propriety
of regulating activities involving the actual functioning of a state
government, including the provision of indispensable public services
of such an economically marginal nature that they would not otherwise be provided, is highly questionable.76 Indeed, it has been suggested that there are special considerations where the federal government endeavors to exercise its power upon activities involving the
functioning of a "State as a State." 77 It should here he noted that
the distinction suggested between regulable and nonregulable state
activities does not rest upon the unworkable and discredited distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary" functi-::ms 78 or upon
arbitrary classifications of state activities on the basis of whether
they are deemed "essential" or "nonessential." 79 Rather, it rests
upon whether the state activity contributes to the public health,
safety, and welfare and would not othenvise be provided were the
state to curtail its activities.80
75. See principal case at 851; Brief for Plaintiff State of Texas a1: 18.
76. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 593-94 (1946), where Justices Douglas and Black observed in dissent:
Many state activities are in marginal enterprises where private capital refuses to
venture. Add to the cost of these projects a federal tax and the social program
may be destroyed before it can be launched. In any case, the reperc.ussions of such
a fundamental change on the credit of the States and on their p1ograms to take
care of the needy and to build for the future would be considerable.
See note 74 supra.
77. 326 U.S. at 582.
78. This approach was discredited in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583
(1946), where Chief Justice Stone noted that he regarded "as untenable the distinction
between 'governmental' and 'proprietary' interest •.••" Early taxing power cases had
used the distinction between governmental and proprietary activities in determining
the amenability of state activities to federal taxation. See, e.g., Allen v. Regents, 304
U.S. 439, 453 (1938); Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214, 225, 227 (1934). See also Annots.,
163 A.L.R. 542 (1946); 155 A.L.R. 423 (1945).
79. The essential-nonessential approach has been rejected by the Supreme Court in
several cases. See, e.g., Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 101 (1946), where the Court, in
rejecting the state's contention that the Emergency Price Control A:t interferes with
the state's performance of an "essential governmental function-the education of its
citizens," said: "[T]he petitioner's argument is that the extent of [t1e war] power as
applied to state functions depends on whether these are 'essential' to the state government. The use of the same criterion in measuring the Constitution:11 power of Congress to tax has proved to be unworkable, and we reject it as a guide in the field here
involved." The contention that the state activity involved was "essential" was likewise
rejected in United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). Even if the distinctions
between governmental and proprietary interests and essential and nonessential activities are helpful insofar as they provide a guide based on past preced,mt, the operation
of both schools and hospitals has long been regarded as "governmental" in nature and
"essential" to the public health, safety, and welfare. See cases collected ISA WoRDs &:
PHRASES 283-86, 297 (1956).
80. See note 74 supra. See generally the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in
New York v. United States, 326 U.S. at 590.
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Finally, there is the argument that a state by engaging in a particular activity has somehow "subjected itself to [the commerce]
power." 81 Thus, if a state were to engage in commercial activities in
competition with private concerns, or if it undertook the operation
of instrumentalities of commerce for the private advantage of the
state and its residents, 82 it would be deemed to be "in commerce"
just as private persons would be were they to engage in such activities. Noteworthy in this respect is the fact that where a state actually competes with private enterprise, it is difficult to argue that
its activity is "indispensable" since even in the absence of state action
the service would be provided by private concerns. Moreover, if the
state were not subject to the federal regulation it might gain an
unfair advantage over its private competitors. It is not easy to see,
however, how the states in operating schools and hospitals have
somehow purposely engaged in commerce. Rather, the effect that
they exert upon interstate commerce arises only as a necessary incident to the performance of functions which are basically noncommercial in nature and essential to the health and welfare of local
residents. 83
Weighing all of these factors, it appears that the issue in the
principal case should be resolved in favor of the states. The 1966
amendments interfere with the states in operating public schools
and hospitals to a degree not justified by the need to effectuate
the congressional objective of eliminating substandard labor conditions throughout the country.
81. California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 568 (1957). The Court held as follows: "If
California, by engaging in interstate commerce by rail, subjects itself to the commerce
power so that Congress can make it conform to federal safety requirements, it has also
subjected itself to that power so that Congress can regulate its employment relation•
ships." See also Parden v. Terminal R.R. Alabama Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964);
New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 579 (1946); United States v. California, 297
U.S. 175 (1936).
82. See California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577, 580 (1944) ("In thus providing
facilities for waterborne traffic, Oakland and California have for many years competed
with privately-owned terminals in San Francisco Bay."); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S.
361, 369 (1934) ("When a state enters the market place seeking customers it divests
itself of its quasi-sovereignty pro tanto, and takes on the character of a trader••••").
83. Lierberthal v. North County Lanes, Inc., 332 F.2d 269 (1964) (citing cases holding that the incidental flow of supplies in interstate commerce does not in itself suffice to transform an essentially intrastate activity into an interstate enterprise). It
would seem that the use of goods originating out of the state is merely incidental toindeed often necessarily incidental to-the various state agencies carrying out their
official governmental duties. See notes 37 and 38 supra and accompanying text.

